History of technological development of the 19th century and events. It marked the beginning of the rapid development of information technology Effects of information technology on productivity, employment and income.
History of technological development: The events of the 19th century, such as the telegraph and the telephone, marked the beginning of the rapid development of information technology. Any communication method that begins with language development can be considered as technological development.
However, at the end of the 19th and 20th centuries, such as the discovery of the telegraph and the telephone, there was a rapid development that gave rise to all the changing information technologies of today.
Telex machines, direct ancestors of email, are no longer used. Faxes are widely used and their use increases daily. Fax is also the system prosecutor and current email network. In the 1960s, some companies were linked to computer technology to handle data processing.
The computers used by these progressive companies were huge mainframes, with tapes and reels that were stored tapes; They were so large that they often filled a large room / terminal_ball with a keyboard.
They were added for mainframes. The drawing was made from scratch because no software was packaged, and computer programmers, often people without commercial or administrative experience.
Technical property The advances in information technology that have led to the development of electronic information in today’s companies are more powerful and less expensive. In the 1970s, more people had computer terminals in large mainframes with access to central information.
A software package was developed so that some functions cannot be programmed from scratch. Sometimes, computers were expensive and costs increased as companies were persuaded to invest in information technology without explicit needs.
The transformation of telecommunications in the 1980s facilitated the development of information technology in organizations with new and powerful personal computers, with the development of fiber optics, local area networks and satellite technology.
Text processing program to collect, store and communicate information. Disorder and change are the ideals of information technology, and reflect. And influence concurrent changes in the structure, benefits, people and business organizations in society. Effects of information technology on productivity, employment and income
In the next two chapters, the committee focuses on the interaction between technology and economics. A general theme emerges: the economic. And social changes caused by technological development are determined not only by the availability of new technologies and their characteristics, but also by ideologies, power structures and human aspirations and agendas.
Technologies are not exogenous forces that affect societies such as tsunamis with predetermined consequences. Instead, our skills, organizations, institutions and values shape how we develop technologies and how they are created once they occur, along with their final impact.
For available skills and the impact of markets towards technological changes, d. See Esmoglu, 1998, Why do new technologies complement skills? Direct technological change and wage inequality, Quarterly Journal of Economics 113 (4): 1055-1090; D. Esmoglu and P. Restrepo, 2016.
The race between machine and man: implications of technology for growth, factor actions and employment”, no. W22252, National Office of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass .; E. Brynjolfsson and A. McAfee, 2014, The Second Machine Age: Work Progress, and Prosperity in a Time of Brilliant Technologies, W.W. Norton, New York.
Suggested quote: “3 effects of information technology on productivity, employment and information”. National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine. 2017. Information technology and the American workforce: Where are we and where are we going from here? Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
In this chapter, the committee considers (1) productivity growth, (2) employment and (3) the current state of income distribution. In each case, the role of technology is considered, recent changes are summarized.
Some possible future developments are considered, discussed in Chapter 2 of current and possible future trends of underlying technologies. It’s based on. The committee is aware that it is dangerous to make predictions about social events.
This is even more difficult to do in relation to the dynamic and changing field of technology. However, the interpretation of social and economic responses to the development of technology can at least provide a framework for thinking about the future.
Robert Solow, in his fundamental research on economic development, discovered that most of the increase in the level of human life was not due to working more hours, or the use of more capital or other resources, but better productivity, it is that is, greater efficiency in production.
As output defined by the ratio of k input. In turn, productivity growth comes from new technologies and distribution of production and distribution. In the mid-1990s, in the United States, the productivity growth rate increased significantly, led by the IT producing sectors and the sectors that use IT.
According to official data from US government agencies. UU., A change is responsible for improving the nature and use of IT3. However, in the last 10 years, the overall productivity growth of the United States has slowed.
Recession Before the Great Recession of 2008, he suggested that the recession is not the only explanation. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity in Computers and Organizational Capital 1: 137–199. On the effect of vested interests in blocking technology, J. See Mokir, 1990.
1. The Levers of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress, Oxford University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom.
For the impact on macro institutions in technology, d. See Esmillu JA Robinson, 2012, Why Nations Fail: Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty, Crown Publishing Group, Chicago, Ill. RM Solo, 1959, A contribution to the theory of economic development, Quarterly Journal of Economics 70 (1): 65–94, doi: 10.2307 / 1884513.
2. The Role of Differences Between Firms, Economics of Innovation and New Technology 3: 183–199; And L. Interest, s. Yang and E. Brynjolfsson, 2002, Intangible assets: computers and organizational capital.
3. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 137-199; K.J. Stiroh, 2002, “Recovering the impact of IT on the production function: a meta-analysis”, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
4. Suggested quote: “3 effects of information technology on productivity, employment and information”. National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine. 2017. Information technology.
And the American workforce: Where are we and where are we going from here? Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. This trend is due in large part to the slowdown in the IT producer and user sectors.
In some ways, this slowdown in productivity growth is contrary to the growing advances and narratives of IT adoption. The remaining part of this section deals with open questions and questions, as well as possible avenues for resolution.
One hypothesis is that measurement problems are increasing in official figures on productivity. This has long been a research challenge, less recognized by Solow5 and Griliches.
Griliches said the economy is changing rapidly in areas where production and production quality are difficult to measure, such as government, health and finance.
5. Products for medical treatment or bank loans are less standardized, instead of counting bushels of wheat or tons of steel. Measurement is also very challenging in areas with rapid technological changes, such as the computer and software industries.
The measurement of production and productivity requires measuring the deflators of production and the price of inputs that reflect changes in quality, which is a great challenge.
How do smartphones compare to mainframes from 20 years ago, much less new applications that have no predecessor? In the 1990s and 2000s, great progress was made in correcting price deflation for IT8 hardware parts.
But the software side has been more challenging. Recent evidence suggests that the adoption of cloud computing and other changes are making it even more difficult to assess quality changes for hardware..
6. A related, but more fundamental, issue is that productivity is not a measure of technological progress or welfare. Productivity is based on gross domestic product (GDP), which is a measure of production or production. However, technological progress can increase well-being without increasing production.
For example, if Wikipedia replaces a paper encyclopedia or a free GPS mapping application with a stand-alone GPS device, consumers may be better when the output is stable or decreasing. jg Fernand, 2014, Productivity.
And potential production before, during and after the Great Recession, NBR Macroeconomics Annual 2014, Volume 29, doi: 10.3386 / w20248. RM Solo, 1987, “We Better Watch Out,” New York Times Book Review, July 12, p. 36). Z.
Griliches, 1994, Productivity, R&D and data scarcity.
American Economic Review 84 (1): 1-office of Economic Analysis, 2000, “National Income and Wealth Division, Investment Branch” and “Computer prices in national accounts”, April.
dm Byron, S.D. Oliner and D.E. Sicily, 2015, “How fast are semiconductor prices falling?”, NBER Working Papers 21074, National Bureau of Economic Research, April, doi: 10.3386 / w21074.
7. Suggested quote: “3 effects of information technology on productivity, employment and information”. National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine. 2017.
Information technology and the American workforce: Where are we and where are we going from here? Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
8. Under this approach, earnings would be reflected in broader measures of economic well-being, but not in GDP (and not in official productivity figures).
While these measurement problems remain an active area of study, the latest research suggests that only a small fraction of the decline in productivity can be attributed to measurement problems.
Another hypothesis is that the reports of higher productivity in the IT producer and user sectors are temporary. Bryanjolfsson and Hitt found evidence that it took up to 7 years to realize the productivity benefits of large business systems.
Since significant changes in the organization and the process were generally required to make full use with software and hardware investment.
The first wave arrived quickly and reflected the adoption of electrification within the existing production organization. The second wave, delayed by a few decades, reflected new ways of organizing production around this new technology.
It may take decades to achieve the full productivity benefits and effects of the new technology. And may require new business practices, infrastructure and similar complementary “co-inventions” that dramatically shape the benefits of the technology and may affect the distribution and its social impact nature.
Similarly, while the first power looms allowed weavers to produce 2.5 times more fabric per hour, knowledge.
And skills improved even more over the next 80 years, producing 80 times per hour. An economy worth mentioning: measuring the value of free digital services on the Internet, “in Proceedings of the International Conference on Information Systems, December.
9. DM Byrne, J.G. Fernand and M. B. Reinsdorf, 2016, Is there a problem of reduced productivity or measurement in the United States ?, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (forthcoming); C. Sieverson, 2016, “The challenges of oblivion explanations for American productivity,” Mimeo.
AD Brynjolfsson and L.M. See Hitt, 2003, Computing Productivity: Firm-Level Evidence, Review of Economics and Statistics 85.4: 93–808. TF See also Breshan, E. Brynjolfsson and L. Hitt, 2002, IT, workplace organization and demand for skilled labor: an enterprise-level analysis, Quarterly Journal of Economics 117 (1): 339–376 , doi: 10.1162 / 003355302753399526.
10. c. Severson, 2013, “Will history repeat itself? ँाँ Comments on Is the Information Technology Revolution Over?”: International Productivity Monitor 25: 20-36. See also PA David, 1990, The Dynamo and the Computer: A historical perspective on the paradox of modern productivity, American Economic Review 80 (2): 355–61.
Edible compartments of computer hardware, including changes in business processes and human capital, can be up to 10 times the direct cost of computer hardware, but they are also expensive and time-consuming to discover and implement.
11. Relatedly, there is evidence that the adoption of new technologies requires organizational changes and restructuring of business practices that occur from time to time.
For example, it is easy to imagine significant benefits, ultimately, of the widespread digitalization of patient data, however, many doctors complain that the process of adopting electronic medical records is slow and cumbersome, with current costs that exceed existing benefits.
12. This perspective can help assimilate the observation of the seemingly rapid changes in technology described in Chapter 2 with the current slow increase in productivity.
However, there are more pessimistic opinions about productivity and economic growth prospects. Some have suggested that recent (post-2000) innovations in information and other advanced technologies do not have the same high payments as innovations in previous periods.
13. The argument is that the previous innovations were in the form of general-purpose technologies that had wide application in many industries. 17 Alternatively, some have argued that we are in a period of secular stagnation due to weak aggregate demand.
It is suggested that there is a persistent weak aggregate demand that acts as a general burden on economic growth. The company-level evidence for the United States and the Organization for Economic Cooperation.
And Development reflects a large gap between the lowest and least productive companies within the industries in the period after 2000. Suggested quote: “3 effects of information technology on productivity, employment and information”. National Academies of Science.
Engineering and Medicine. 2017. Information technology and the American workforce: Where are we and where are we going from here?
Frictions or distortions in the economy (for example, greater competition) slow down the proliferation process or accelerate business mobility that is important for transferring resources to more productive companies. The latter is shown as an important part of the productivity improvement process.
And is analyzed in more detail in Chapter 4. From this point of view, the hypothesis is that, although the changes in technology mentioned in Chapter 2 they are happening, they are slow to show economic growth due to slow expansion or business mobility.
All these hypotheses are active areas of research. The discussion of future research directions in Chapter 6 emphasizes the importance of exploring such important critical questions.
It is useful to keep in mind that future productivity growth cannot be estimated simply by eliminating past trends because growth rates have very few serial relationships from one decade to the next.
In contrast, future trends are necessary for the invention and deployment of new and improved technologies and for effective use in co-inventions. Technology and employment- Employment in recent years:
14. In recent years, employment growth in the United States has been quite strong, with a decrease in unemployment. For example, in early 2016, the unemployment rate fell below 5 percent.
However, this increase in employment can be interpreted as a recovery from the Great Recession, which has slowed down even though it officially ended in 2009.
In addition, jobs lost during the recession are very different from those observed during the recovery. 20 While many opportunities are created in areas that do not require a bachelor’s degree, the fastest-growing occupational categories require a bachelor’s degree or better.
And occupations require a bachelor’s degree Those who increase at double the rate of those who do not 21,22. There have been substantial changes in employment in various occupational categories. For example, employment rates in the administrative office.
15. Suggested quote: “3 effects of information technology on productivity, employment and information”. National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine. 2017.
16. Information technology and the American workforce: Where are we and where are we going from here?
Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. Sales jobs have decreased dramatically, while employment has increased in professional jobs, as shown in Figure 3.1.23
17. Despite the low unemployment rate, the general employment rate in the United States (employment-to-population ratio) is at a minimum of 20 years.
The general employment rate in the United States showed an upward trend until the year 2000, mainly driven by the greater participation of women in the labor force.
18. This decrease began in the post-2000 period, with a sharp decrease during the 2000 recession, which caused a slight recovery. For some of this trend, the aging of the population can be explained.
However, the decline in employment rates is particularly large for young and less educated people. Employment rates for elderly men (25-54 years) remain low, compared to a maximum of 95 percent in 1967 (84 percent in 2014, about a minimum of 50 years of 81 percent in 2010.
19. Suggested quote: “3 effects of information technology on productivity, employment and information”. National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine. 2017. Information technology and the American workforce: Where are we and where are we going from here? Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226 / 24649.
20. Annual average of the Bureau of Labor Statistics) .24 underlines that the general decline cannot be explained only by the aging population of the United States. 25,26 While both globalization and technology are considered important factors, many economists see automation as the key.
The most important factor for example, Larry Katz, an expert in labor studies and editor of the Quarterly Journal of Economics, said: “In the long run, obviously, automation is more important, not even close.”
21. Among younger and less educated workers, the decline has also been particularly strong for some particular racial / ethnic groups (especially non-Hispanic blacks).
In addition, in 2014 almost a third of all the unemployed were classified as “long-term unemployed” (that is, outside the labor market for more than 27 weeks), and many eventually became “depressed workers.”
22. That leave people out of the market for work as a whole .28 These patterns are of particular concern in the context of this report, since these are the most vulnerable groups that are technology. You can overcome the ongoing changes to Giki .
While the story may be apocryphal, the famous Roman historian Pliny the Elder described how the Roman emperor Tiberius killed an inventor who had invented unbreakable glass for fear of what he would do for the glass trade.
23. Queen Elizabeth I also refused to grant William Lee a patent for her mechanical knitting machine, arguing: “Consider what the invention can do for my poor subjects.”
Not only the emperor and the queen have feared the implications of new technologies for employment. Most famous British textile workers…
24. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Employment rate: 25-54 years: men for the United States”, FRED, recovered from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis..
25. sj Davis and J. Haltiwanger, 2014, “Labor market fluidity and economic performance”, University of Chicago and NBER and Maryland and NBER.
26. s.a. Donovan, “2015, Summary of the employment-population relationship”, Congress Research Service, May 2, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44055.pdf.
27. Claire Cain Miller was quoted as saying: “The long-term job killer is not China: it’s automation,” The New York Times, December 21, 2016, m. Finale, 1973, Ancient Economy, University of California Press, Berkeley, California; D. Esmoglu and J. Robinson, 2011, Why Nations Fail, Crown, New York.
28. Suggested quote: “3 effects of information technology on productivity, employment and information”. National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine. 2017. Information technology and the American workforce: Where are we and where are we going from here?
In the early nineteenth century, known as the Luddites, they feared that the new automation that came with power looms, storage frames and rotating frames threatened to replace their specialist posts with poorly paid workers.
29. The machines were destroyed and John’s house Kaye burned, the inventor of the “flying ferry”. In an effort to prevent destructive acts, the British Parliament enacted a law that “crushes” a capital offense.
More recently, economist John Maynard Keynes predicted that the arrival of new technologies would generate a lot of wealth, but also widespread technological unemployment as machines replace humans.
In 1930, he predicted that the work week would fall to 15 hours and that the “economic problem” for basic needs would be solved. The economic historian Robert Helbronner made a similar prediction in 1965: “As machines continue to invade society, more and more imitation. And the higher the number of social tasks, the lower the human work.
Less, as we now think , ‘work’, which gradually makes sense “.32 Nobel laureate Vasily Leontief saw a similarity between human work and horses of the early twentieth century. He predicted in 1952 that humans would follow horses to become redundant: “Work will be less and less important.
More and more workers will be replaced by machines. I don’t see the new industries employing all men.” Who wants a job?
While widespread and technically motivated unemployment predictions have not passed, technological changes (and possibly many of the above) have stimulated demand, creating new markets, at least so far. Salary increases made and increased. Some adverse consequences for total employment.
30. To be sure, the technologies explained and will continue to explain particular businesses. As the Luddites feared, the artisans lost their jobs by turning and then weaving in the form of new technologies that they had previously demonstrated. k.y. Lomrud, f. Maryland and O.R. Stromume, the Union’s opposition to globalization and technological change.
jm Keynes, 1933, “Economic perspectives for our grandchildren (1930)”, p. 358-373 in Essays on Persuasion, W.W. Norton & Company, New York. R.L. Hellebronner, 1965, Men and machines in perspective, National affairs, Autumn, pp.
31. w. Leontief, 1952, Machines and Man, Scientific American 87 (3): 150–160. For a more recent perspective on this issue, e. Brynjolfsson and A. See McPhee, 2015, “Will Human Go the Way of Horse?”. Foreign affairs (July / August), PP. 8-14.. Acemoglu and Restropo, 2016, “The race between machine and man”.
32. We note, however, that the duration of the work week has decreased considerably since 1800, when a work week of more than 70 hours was not uncommon. For more information on this point, see the Economic History Association, “Hours of work in the history of the United States”.
33. Suggested quote: “3 effects of information technology on productivity, employment and information”. National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine. 2017. Information technology and the American workforce.
WWhere are we and where are we going from here? Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
34. Similarly, replacing horses with cars eliminated the need for blacksmiths. But as these jobs disappeared, new people developed to operate, manage and serve new technologies.
For example, in the late 1800s, the replacement of railroad cars went hand in hand to create new jobs for managers, engineers, machinery, repairers and drivers. Along with this, a range of new sales service companies emerged, from teaching to entertainment.
However, the simultaneous automation of a wide range of tasks can create unemployment or perhaps reduce overall employment levels for long periods of time. As in the previous section.
In the last 20 years, the proportion of working people (the employment-population ratio) has decreased. While there are many factors at work, it is possible that the technical substitution of some types of work is part of the explanation.
As compensation for work falls, which can be done faster with machines, some people may choose to work for little or no work, finding other options, including extending vacations or family time, applying for disability benefits Making or investing in education becomes more attractive.
In the long run, the continuation of the long-term decline in the proportion of hours worked as a society may continue as one becomes richer and leisure becomes more attractive.
What happens depends on whether new technologies automate and replace workers in existing jobs, creating new demands for labor. It would be difficult to answer what the case would be, since it is easy to see how new technologies are coming in the future.
It will automate existing tasks, such as imagining the tasks that still exist. They are not and how new technologies can stimulate greater consumer demand. In addition, the future of employment is not only a matter of availability or need for the work to be done.
But also how they are organized, compensated and more valued by society. These are matters of commercial strategy, social organization and political options and not only driven by the technologies themselves.
Consider cars without a driver. In theory, driving and delivery companies can automate themselves with the use of such technologies over the next decades. A futuristic philosophy with fully automated vehicles has captured the imagination of many.
However, there are many social, cultural and technical barriers to this result. These include factors such as consumer confidence; The fact is that there will be a long period of mixed-use road use with autonomous driving and the exchange of roads with manual-driving cars; And infrastructure is required.
35. Acemoglu and Restrepo also provide evidence that new companies have made an important contribution to job growth in the last three decades: Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2016, “The race between machine and man”.
Suggested quote: Effects of information technology on productivity, employment and information”. National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine. 2017.
Information technology and the American workforce.
Where are we and where are we going from here? Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
Parents should expand the use and performance of driverless cars.
It is possible that the continued development of these technologies, including infrastructure, will create more jobs than are lost as a result of self-propelled vehicles, but the skills required for such jobs are likely to be present.
It will be very different from Truckers and taxi drivers. It is likely that new jobs depend more on analytical, cognitive and technical skills. In fact, even in the short term, as autonomous driving technology is developed, road transport is likely to be in possession.
36. For example, additional IT-based capabilities for driver simulation training can Help improve the skill set of more drivers than would otherwise be possible. In the long term, greater automation will reduce the need for additional drivers and ultimately reduce the overall demand for truck drivers.
“Platooning”, where a single leading vehicle driven by a driver is chased by a number of other autonomous vehicles, is already emerging as a viable technique for road driving and affects the number of Can jobs.
Since transportation costs are reduced due to partial automation, lower unit costs may lead to higher demand (for example, for more delivery services), resulting in increased demand for drivers in the opposite direction.
It has a partially receptive force. Autonomous cars have a good representation of the variable and mixed effects on technology, as well as long and often uneven gears of Technological Development, which complicates the ability to make accurate long-term estimates.
In addition to eliminating some jobs while others are being created, technological developments can create new occupations without reducing employment in old occupations. New medical imaging technologies are an example of this.
Before the development of computer-controlled imaging modalities, such as ultrasound, CT scans and magnetic resonance imaging, most technicians working in radiology departments operated X-ray machines and standard fluoroscopes.
The advent of the digital image did not significantly change the work associated with these technologies. Instead, the profession of new technicians arose.
And sonographers, computed tomography technologists and MRI technologists, as well as the profession of technicians who serve such machines. Therefore, in the case of medical images, the general number.
37. Truck driving is an important source of employment and middle class jobs in the United States. In fact, according to a recent analysis by NPR in 2014, “truck drivers, deliveries and tractors” were the most common occupational category in 29 states, see Q. Bui, 2015,
“Map: The most common job in all states “, NPR..
Occupations expanded and, therefore, those employed as technicians. In addition, with the progress of technology, in terms of advances in images and developments in images and other fields of biomedical engineering, radiologists began to specialize in a whole new radiology subdiscipline, particularly in imaging modalities and “interventional radiology”.
Expand the range of professional opportunities within radiology and increase the need for radiologists. However, technologies can also have an impact on how tasks are assigned and how task categories and tasks associated with particular organizational forms and structures are designed. For example, they can transfer the business assignment in such a way that some businesses operate as contracts.
Which once carried out are transferred to members of other businesses. 3 An educational example is in the context of word processing technologies and online databases. Academic department specialized in the university.
As recently as in the 1980s, administrative assistants answered the phone, interacted with the students, kept paper records of the accounts, filed documents and typed letters, memoranda and manuscripts to the faculty (which often did internships).
He wrote the first draft). Today, administrative assistants continue to answer phones and interact with students, but some form of documentation for teachers. Teachers now use a computer to create and modify their own documents.
Some teachers also enter their data on travel expenses and other activities directly into the database, tasks previously performed by administrative assistants. These and other changes eliminated some functions of the administrative assistants and transferred them to the faculty.
Which can be seen as examples of “apathy”. 40 Due to the greater efficiency of documents in production and storage, and because teachers have assumed the task of producing documents, universities now employ fewer administrative assistants some of those who have acquired new skills and functions, such as maintenance.
38. SR Barley, 1986, Technology as an opportunity for structure: Evidence of observations of CT scanners and the social system of radiology departments.
Administrative Science Quarterly 31: 78-108; S.R Barley, 1990, Alignment of technology and structure through roles and networks, Administrative Science Quarterly 35: 61-103.
39. j. Bessen, 2015, “How computer automation affects companies: technology, jobs and skills”, Law and Economics Working Paper No. 15-49, Boston University School of Law, Boston, Massachusetts.
40. Disintegration means that elimination in the supply chain or workflow refers to tasks or people because work is no longer the workflow (R. Benjamin and R. Wiegand, 1995, in the electronic market and information from someone already deployed in the virtual value chain.
They are made) Superhighway, Sloan Management Review 36: 62–67; AM Chirku and RJ Kaufman, 1999, Strategies for Internet intermediaries in the intermediate / decentridation / reintermination cycle, Electronic markets 9 (1–2: 109–117; U. Schultz and WJ) Orlikowski, 2004.
A network relationship mediated by Technology Practical perspective: use of Internet-based self-service techniques, Information Systems Research 5 (1): 87–106.
Information technology and the American workforce: Where are we and where are we going from here? Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226 / 24649.
As noted in Chapter 2, advances in robotics will increasingly affect jobs that involve physical work, although there is a debate about the timeline. The committee notes that the impact of technologies on employment can be shaped by interests and social mobility beyond the technical dimension.
For example, computer-mediated communication, especially those provided by the Web, such as e-mail, computer teleconferencing and the transfer of all types of documents to space (and, therefore, time zones) in an easy and almost way snapshot. Skill, initially thought.
Only as a more efficient way to communicate. But because these technologies did not require joint placement, companies began using technologies that went from abroad and abroad for tasks and even jobs.
The recent article 43 by economist David Autor called philosopher Michael Polanyi: “We can know more than we can say…. Driver skills cannot be completely replaced by schooling in car theory; knowledge of my own Body is completely different.
41. Bill Gates predicted in 2016 that “the replacement of pure labor for jobs that are largely physical and visual manipulation – driving, security guards, warehouse work, waiters, maids, that threshold – I don’t think you’ll have more disagreements than this In the next 15 years.
The equivalent robot in terms of cost, in terms of reliability, will become an alternative to those activities “(E. Klein, 2016,” Bill Gates: The Energy The advance will save our planet “Less than 15 years”, Vaux, last update of February,
42. Suggested quote: “3 effects of information technology on productivity, employment and information”. National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine. 2017.
Information technology and the American workforce: Where are we and where are we going from here? Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226 / 24649.
43. Knowledge of his physiology. “This phenomenon, that silent knowledge is often more than explicit cognition, is known as Polniy’s paradox. Currently, computer systems eliminate creativity, intuition, persuasion and imaginative problem solving, or ability of coordinatin.
And leading teams Author and others have argued that many highly valued and important human capabilities can never be automated.45 As technology becomes more sophisticated and compressed.
The administration of human interfaces can become an important component of more and more jobs; there is already evidence that social skills are valued in the growing demand and the labor market.
For example….Although the shared travel service does not require drivers to specialize in internal combustion engines or smartphones to do their work.
They have reasonably good interpersonal skills to succeed In this era of online qualifications. Professional programs are required, even in commercial disciplines such as vocational and engineering, may require them to add interpersonal and creative skills to a mix of difficult analytical skills.
44. Human intelligence and people’s resistance to automate “presence” and the multiple dimensions of leadership suggest that there will probably be a lasting market value for specific traits and factors that are exclusively human, since only humans perform certain types of tasks.
You can do it for the future, if not forever. To what extent these human characteristics, including creativity, empathy, interpersonal skills, leadership, mentoring and physical presence, are currently valued in the American workforce.
And how will these specific human skills be valued in the future force American labor? Several of these distinct human characteristics include cognitive and “non-cognitive” skills.
On the other hand, recent improvements in machine learning have allowed significant technological advances, for example, the field of driverless cars, which suggests that Polanyi’s ideal example of not even driving an engine is immune to automation.
45. The growing presence of research conferences on artificial intelligence (AI), such as the annual neuronal information processing system and the conferences of the Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence, shows that an increasing number of researchers are trying to overcome these challenges.
And most of them now focus on methods that allow machines to know how to perform tasks. Learn, from identifying and labeling objects to understanding speech, improving mastery and mobility.
It is commonly understood that by increasing productivity, IT will increase overall revenues, although without guaranteeing that these benefits will be distributed evenly.
In addition, while it is common to focus on average income levels and income growth, the distribution of those benefits can also have an impact on well-being.
This is true not only because absolute levels directly affect the quality of life of particular groups, but also because broader perceptions of injustice can have negative psychological effects and inequality can contribute to socio-political stress.
46. Since the mid-1970s, the United States has experienced a significant increase in inequality in both income and wealth. It is the subject of a large volume of literature and has been documented in great detail by Acemoglu, Autor, Katz, Piketty, Saez and many others.
One aspect of this is the growing extension between productivity growth and workers’ median compensation.
Since most of the income growth moved to the top of the income distribution.
During the last decades, computer science and automation have been an important engine of this increase in inequality, although there are other forces in action. A very popular approach has been to increase the revenue share of the top 1 percent of each of these distributions.
While this growth has been substantial, income inequality has also increased by the other 99 percent, with the top 1 percent of households with an income share of more than 10 percent to 20 percent between 1980 and 2012, what was accounted for is.
47. Approximately the increasing skill premium associated with a 4-year university degree. For example, the absolute average income gap between people with a high school and a university degree almost doubled between 1980 and 2012.
And as real salaries of university graduates increased and the number of less educated workers increased to around 2000.48.
A related phenomenon is the decline in the proportion of GDP paid by labor in relation to capital owners (illustrated in Figure 3.5) .49 This trend affects not only income, but also money (for which income of a person would have contributed It).
For 47 reviews, for example, D.H. Author, L.F. Katz and M.S. Kearney, 2008, Trends in wage inequality in the United States: revisionist review, economics and statistics review 90.2: 300–323; T. Piketty, 2014, Twenty-First Century Capital, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts; And t. Piketty and E. Sage, 2013, Main Revenue and the Great Recession: Recent Proposals and Political Implications, IMF Economic Review 51 (3): 456–478, doi: 10.1057 / imfer.2013.14.
48. dh Author, 2014, with the increase in inequality in skills, education and income, the other 99 percent, ‘Science 344 (6186): 843-851.. l. Qarabarunis and B. Neiman, 2013, Global Declines of Labor Share, Quarterly Journal of Economics 128 (1): 61–103, do: 10.3386 / w19136.
Suggested quote: “3 effects of information technology on productivity, employment and information”.
National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine. 2017. Information technology and the American workforce: Where are we and where are we going from here? Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226 / 24649.
(Over time). This suggests that the trend in income is in favor of those who have already earned money. This decrease in the labor share of GDP, if maintained, will have an impact on the distribution of wealth and income, and the share of total income will increase for wealth holders.
49. In this scenario of inequality, many factors are likely to work; Technological changes, social prejudices, globalization and increased trade, decrease in the density and power of trade unions, decreases in the real minimum wage, changes in the rules on executive compensation, increase in economic damage, changes in tax rates and elites Growth.
In some cases, simple monopolies, are among the expected causes of income and wealth inequality in the last 40 years. For the purposes of this study, the committee focuses on the role of technology in the distribution of income and wealth.
Along with employment, the case that contributes to inequality due to technological development is strong. During most of the twentieth century, real average incomes increased sharply as real GDP per capita of people’s income in the 50th percentile, suggesting that the benefits of improved technological progress were widely shared.
But since the late 1970s, per capita productivity and GDP have continued to increase, while medieval incomes have increased (illustrated in Figure 3.2), reflecting the growing income inequality in a period of significant technological changes.
There is a debate in the research literature and, in fact, how much credit should be given to technology to increase inequality among committee members. There are three main statements that reflect technological change as a force towards inequality in recent decades.
First, many new technologies have replaced labor-intensive, routine and physical tasks and have led to a greater demand for work in jobs that require social skills, arithmetic, abstract thinking and flexibility. This change is often attributed to higher returns. University education and income gap between qualified and low.
50. For this and other figures of inequality of wealth, E.N. Wolff, 2012, The Asset Price Meltdown and Wealth of the Middle Class, New York University, New York; AB Atkinson, T. Piketty and E. Saiz, 2011, Top Income in Long History, Journal of Economic Literature 49.1: 3-71; And t. Piketty, 2014, Capital in the 21st century, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
51. For example, b. Western and J. Rosenfeld, 2011, Trade unions, standards and the increase in US wage inequality, American Sociological Review 76 (4): 513-537, dr: 10.1177 / 0007122411414817.
52. j. Farman and P. Orszag, 2015, “A company-level perspective on the role of income in increasing inequality,” White House, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/page/ files /20151016_firm_level_perspective_on_role_of_rents_in_inequality.pdf.
53. T. Piketty, Capital in the 21st Century, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass, p. 70).. See, for example, D.J. Demand, 2015, “The growing importance of social skills in the labor market”, National Bureau of Economic Research, doi: 10.3386 / w21473.
Suggested quote: “3 effects of information technology on productivity, employment and information”. National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine. 2017.
Information technology and the American workforce: Where are we and where are we going from here? Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226 / 24649.
54. Fig. 3.2 Decrease in per capita productivity, employment and average GDP income. Source: E. Brynjolfsson and A. McPhee, “Why the middle class is shrinking,” Harvard Business Review, November 5, 2015, https://hbr.org/video/4598665579001-why-the-middle-class -is-shruti, consulted in April 2016 Gone Data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Skilled workers Second, as labor-intensive tasks are automated, the proportion of income that goes to capital in relation to labor may increase, leading to a decrease in the proportion of labor work in the general GDP both in the United States and in the United States (as in Figure 3.5).
Abroad Thirdly, improvements in communications technologies have led to what has been called a “superstar phenomenon,” which allows the most successful artists in any business to gain a greater share in the global market.
This part reflects its superior ability to sell to customers not only in local markets, but also in regional, national and even worldwide markets, as well as the cost of reaching wider audiences in the form of improved communication technologies. Geography and consumer ignorance have become less important as barriers to entry, which makes.
55. d. Cuckoo, 1997, “Rich man, poor man, superstar”, independent, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/rich-man-poor-man-superstar-1271342.html; S. Rosen, The Economics of Superstars, The American Economic Review 71 (5): 845–858, 1981.
It is easy for sellers with a superior product to obtain a significant market share. 5 It is also sometimes said that this phenomenon explains the increasing proportion of national income derived from the top 1 percent of the wage distribution.
Changes in IT also seem to play a role in the changing demand for skills and income inequality for the other 99 percent. Technology can be a complement for highly skilled workers, as well as an option for low or medium-skilled workers.
This is often called the hypothesis of technological change biased by skill. 5,8,59,60 When new technologies have different skill requirements than the previous ones, they favor workers with these skills.
As long as the offer does not change enough, it will change wages in favor of a more efficient group. 61 In recent decades, the impact of IT has been disproportionate in the delivery of skills.6 Since 1970, men with a college or university education have seen their salaries rise.
While those with secondary education or low wages have seen a wage decrease. It has been suggested that this divergence has been eliminated due to the increasing dependence on technology in the workplace, since the skills needed to work with these technologies are faster
56. AD Brynjolfsson, Y.J. Hu and M.S. Rehman, Omnicline Retail Age Competition, MIT Sloan Management Review 54: 23, 2013.
57. For example, e. Brynjolfsson and A. McAfee, 2014, The Second Machine Age, W.W. Norton & Company, New York.
58. d. Card and J.E. DeNardo, 2002, Biased change in skill and increased wage inequality: some problems and riddles, Journal of Labor Economics 20: 4, doi: 10.3386 / w8769.
59. dh Author, L.F. Katz and M.S. Kearney, 2008, Trends in American Wage Inequality: Revising Revisionists, Review of Economics and Statistics 90 (2): 300–323.
60. c. Goldin and L.F. Katz, 2007, “The race between education and technology: the development of the American educational wage gap, 1890 to 2005”, National Bureau of Economics, doi: 10.3386 / w12484.
61. This approach differs from the common claim that new technologies always create inequality. In fact, many new nineteenth-century techniques automated previous skilled occupations.
And expanded unskilled assembly tasks that paid lower wages than previous forms of work. For example, Luddites may have been fooled in their tactics of destroying mechanical spinning.
And weaving machines, but they were right that the way these machines were used was bad news for them: relatively high payments The web workers were gradually replaced by less paid machines.
And bidding machines. In general, if there is a mismatch between the skills of the workforce and the skill requirements of the new technologies, changes in the salary structure should be followed.
62. World Economic Forum, Global Employment Agenda Council, 2014, “Combining skills and labor market needs: Building social alliances for better skills and better jobs”.
d.h. Author, L.F. Katz and M.S. Cairney, 2008.
63. The Trend of Pay Inequality in America: Revising Revisionists, Review of Economics and Statistics 90 (2): 300–323; D.H. Author, 2014, 9999 percent among the growing inequality in skills, education and income, ‘Science 344 (6186): 843-851.
And the American workforce: Where are we and where are we going from here? Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226 / 24649.
Acquired through higher education.64 addresses this challenge, with the skills gap so wide that more than half of employers report that they have had difficulty finding qualified job seekers to fill certain jobs they believe are partly due to educational gaps.
65. In the 1980s and 1990s, these changes in technology, together with complementary factors such as globalization, deregulation and demonetization, have contributed to a decrease in the demand for mid-level skills.
And this has been reflected both in the employment as in volume. It has occurred in salaries for workers with medium skills (see Figure 3.4).
In particular, workers who perform routine jobs (such as production jobs in construction or office duties) have seen their demand decrease due to many factors, including changing technology. This reflected a decrease in manufacturing employment, even when production reached an all-time high.
66. Globalization has further eroded the demand for such skills in advanced economies such as the United States. In contrast, job opportunities have expanded into professional, technical and managerial occupations, and high-skilled and high-wage occupations, such as low-skilled ones, r. Valletta, 2015.
Higher education, salaries and polarization, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. Recent survey by 66 Manpower Group found that this is a worldwide trend, with 38% of employers surveyed who reported a 7-year talent shortage in 2015; See Manpower Group, 2015, 2015 Talent Shortage Survey.
Fig. 3.4 In panels A and B, workers in the midst of the distribution of skills have reduced employment growth rates and salary increases compared to workers up and down. Source: (A) D.H. Author and D. Dorn, 2013,
Growth of low-skilled and polarized service jobs in the US labor market, American Economic Review 103 (5): 1553–1597. Courtesy of David Autor, David Dorn and the American Economic Association.
67. Suggested quote: “3 effects of information technology on productivity, employment and information”. National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine. 2017. Information technology and the American workforce.
Where are we and where are we going from here? Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226 / 24649.
FIGURE 3.5 Declining labor participation in the income of the world’s largest economies, following linear trend lines. Source: L. Qarabarunis and B. Neiman, 2014, Global Decline of Labor Share with the Permission of Oxford University Press, Quarterly Journal of Economics 129 (1): 61-103.
68. Low-wage occupations such as food service, personal care and protective service occupations. ६68,६ations..But changes in skill demands are far from being the only factors at work. In addition, technology can help reduce the participation rate in the workforce.
69. Generate a wider change in the relationship between labor and capital, as advanced technology is incorporated into the capital tools that replace many workers. In the United States but in many countries of the world. Figure 3.5 shows the overall decrease in labor participation in income. Actual compensation for work includes a decrease in…
70. AD Brynjalfsson and A. McAfee, 2014, The Second Machine Age: Work, Progress, and Prosperity in the Brilliant Technologies at a Time, W.W. Norton & Company, New York.
72. The owners of the most successful IT companies and entrepreneurs who have introduced new products, business models and platforms are among the biggest winners.
This corresponds to the emergence of the “innovative class”, which suggests that neither workers nor capital owners will benefit more from technological development.
73. Instead, the rapid proliferation of digital technology can allow a third class, people who can create and deliver new products, services and business models, to thrive immensely.
In addition, there is evidence that senior executives, such as CEOs, have experienced the fastest growth in industries that use IT with greater intensity, gathering more detailed information.
And more people and assets with them. It is capable of transmitting its decisions more effectively. This can increase their power, importance and relative salary.
74. While the gender pay gap has narrowed since the 1980s, it is important to keep in mind that significant pay gaps by race and gender remain in the United States.
According to a recent analysis by the Pew Research Center, 80 hourly earnings in 2015 for women were only 83 percent of white men. And of black workers only 75 percent of white men.
Many, but all these gaps are explained by different education and experience. The fact that different groups participate in different industries and business sectors at different rates.
75. Even when they controlled education, white men won all groups except Asian men; White and Asian women eclipsed Hispanic and black men and women.
How these inequalities will change as a result of future technological changes; The gender and occupational fields are further analyzed in other chapter.
76. An important variable to understand and shape future development is the way in which vocational education and training institutions may not coincide between new technologies and existing skills. The beginning of the 20th century was also a period of rapid technological change in the US economy.
77. However, current evidence suggests that wage inequality decreased during this era, as the US education system significantly increased primary and labor availability.
78. AD Brynjolfsson, a. McPhee and M.I. Spence, 2014, “New world order: work, capital and ideas in the economics of the law of power”, Foreign Affairs.
79. AD Brynjolfsson, h. Kim and Ji. Saint-Jacques, 2015, CEO Salary and information technology, business and income distribution: the role of productivity and luck, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
80. AD Patton, 2016, “Racial, gender pay gaps persist despite some progress in the United States,” Pew Research Center. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/01/racial-gender-wage-gaps-persist-in-us-despite-someprogress.
Suggested quote: “3 effects of information technology on productivity, employment and information”. National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine. 2017. Information technology and the American workforce:
Where are we and where are we going from here? Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226 / 24649.
Secondary education However, this does not mean that investing more in a single type of education is the best way to reduce inequality. It may be necessary to think more immediately to determine what is needed to provide the educational system.
Current evidence so far suggests that a greater number of skills and the ability to think abstractly can help.
A set of other skills, including cognitive, physical, interpersonal, networking and problem-solving skills, are also likely to be affected.
But the emphasis on any fixed set of skills can be very retrospective. As technology continues to evolve, it is likely that the future workforce will also evolve.
This suggests that flexibility will likely remain an important skill, one that is particularly supported by the current school system, specifically, to enable lifelong learning and adaptability for a changing labor market.
This discussion suggests that to make the best use of new technologies without increasing income inequality in society, adjustments are necessary.
Although the greatest adjustment burden is likely to fall on the skills, competencies and flexibility of workers, the prospect that technology is not a force of nature and can be shaped and transformed by social decisions suggests that technology A social impact Positive can occur if it is built with certain values in mind.
Can society continue to reap the benefits of new technologies, while modifying their implementation so that they create more work for the marginalized of society, make better use of existing workers and workers? To create deep satisfaction?
Numerically controlled or programmed, the history of machine tools is instructive at this point. In the first days of the numerical control, the task of writing programs for machine tools was assigned to the programmer and not to the driver. The programs were encoded on paper tape or punch cards and fed to machine tools.
The machinists only supervised the team. This led some to argue that the administration would be isolated, because the administration wanted to take away the knowledge of the execution.
But with the rapid improvements in the microchip, computers became small enough to integrate into machine tools, and machinery now gained access to computers and programs.
He began learning to make changes and eventually modified the code that governs his devices. In summary, programming became part of the machinist’s task.
Recent technologies such as Baxter and Sawyer’s Robotics of Rethink Robotics take it further, allowing line workers to “program” machines, moving them only through steps. Directing physically, instead of writing computer code. Reiterates that this discussion about technology and inequality.
81. D.F. Noble, 1984, Forces of Production, Transaction Publishers. Suggested quote: “3 effects of information technology on productivity, employment and information”. National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine. 2017. Information technology and the American workforce: Where are we and where are we going from here? Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226 / 24649.
It should not be understood that all aspects of inequality and its recent increase in Western countries can only be attributed to technological change: the role of the disappearance of trade unions, wage concessions and employment structures should also be considered.
Workspace with low wage rates, fiscal policy and a growing contribution of financial investments in the accumulation of wealth. In fact, there is a political dimension of growing inequality in the United States, a phenomenon that is certainly not new.
82. Politically powerful individuals and groups have long deployed their power to increase their economic income. This is seen today as some business groups that campaign for a special treatment of their line of business or for the continuation of fiscal loopholes.
However, there is also a technical element for such demand for income and inequality. Some of the most luxurious salaries on Wall Street are paid by hedge funds.
Which implement increasingly sophisticated computers and algorithms to execute arbitration operations or information in terms of milliseconds, ahead of their competitors.
This is only one aspect of the potential use of technology in ways that do not necessarily promote social welfare, but generate great benefits for those who implement and control it.
In summary, new technologies can participate in the elimination of occupations, create new occupations, change the distribution of tasks between occupations and change the geographical division of labor.
The mobility forces of employment and wage inequality That are not exclusively or even predominantly Technological in nature: institutional patterns, legal structures, tax structures and management ideologies that emphasize the accumulation of wealth play a role.
Most importantly, these forces interacted with technology and vice versa, to shape the final results. Consequently, the ways in which a particular technology, or a range of new and rapidly changing technologies, will affect employment and income are not predetermined.
The committee again warns the reader to assume that all the effects of technology on employment and inequality have their origin in the nature of technology. How technologies affect work and employment, not just in obstacles and expenses.
83. There are some interesting similarities with the effects of import competition. For example, Author, Dorn and Hanson (2013) found that the increase in Chinese imports led to higher unemployment, lower labor force participation.
And reduced wages in local markets, including competitive products (DH Author, D Dorn, and GH Hanson). , 2013, The China Syndrome: Local Work Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States, American Economic Review 103.6: 2121-2168).
84. Suggested quote: “3 effects of information technology on productivity, employment and information”. National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine. 2017.
85. Technology, but also about the complex interactions between technologies, organizations, skills, institutions, markets, culture and public policies. However, according to previous research, the committee believes that several generalizations are possible.
86. Productivity is the main driver of the increase in living standards. In turn, innovation, dissemination or adoption of technology is the main driver of productivity improvement.
87. The effective use of technology generally requires profiles of complementary skills in the workforce and a shift towards optimization of business processes, work organization and institutional processes. These changes can be expensive and take decades to develop:
88. While productivity continues to increase, it does not appear to be growing so fast in the late 1990s and early 2000s. This may reflect a combination of factors.
Some of which are associated with the lack of matching benefits, reduced mobility, inherent inherent often with the implementation of new technologies or secular stagnation.
89. Technology has transformed employment by automating certain tasks and creating the need for new ones, a trend that will probably continue. As a result, some entire companies may become obsolete and new companies will emerge.
90. Employment will change from one occupation to another, while some occupations will simply experience a change in their set of required skills.
While the proportion of working people has declined in the last 20 years, changes within and between occupations will be much more financially important than changes in the general level of employment.
New computerized technologies contribute to increasing income inequality and are likely to continue until historically they have replaced the skills and functions associated with low-wage or middle-wage occupations.
Jobs that require more abstract cognitive skills or that provide personal services that currently have no financial value. These differences will be mainly reflected in wages and income, although they can also be submitted to work for a few hours and to general employment.